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[page] 2 Would any one have bought from them or the survivor of them the testator's land, or his bank stock? or any thing else, except some of those things which perish in the use? 3. How is this distinguishable from any other life or uncertain interest? The testator intended to give to his two Daughters while living & single his negroes. Suppose he had done it by name & specifically, indicating his intent even more clearly than by the general words he has used, would the Daughters have taken the issue after [both?] of the negroes? 4. If the survivor of the two daughters had a right to sell the issue, she had a right to sell the parent. If the ultimate bequest of property to the emancipated slaves is subject to the [prime?] right to dispose thereof absolutely or the part of the life tenants, the bequest of freedom is not less so. The same general words which cover the property of the testator, include them, and their legacy of freedom is no more certain, than the [devise? desire?] to them of [illegible] or the bequest or recognition of offspring. Mr. Hopkins relies on the case of Reddick v Cohoon 4. Ran 457 and the cases there cited. I do not controvert that decision or the authorities cited for it. But observe the difference. In that case, the devise was in fee, with a contingent limitation over, which was held to be too remote. There under the [illegible] in fee a power to dispose in fee was held to [press? pass?] to the [illegible] devisee. And that power being [illegible] to an interest was held to absorb the whole estate, and consequently to [annul?] all [illegible] dispositions. Here is a devise not in fee, but for life at the utmost, liable to be [shortened?] by marriage. but incapable of being extended by our life. The testator not only did not give to the heirs or assigns of the first taken anything, but he excluded their natural heirs, and conferred his bounty to them personally, and to them only while they should remain incapable of removing natural heirs. Nothing is given to them in absolute property, nor is any power to dispose in absolute property given to them. Their power to dispose is the result of their interest, not extended by any [grasp? grant?] of a power beyond their interest. And that interest being limited, the power to dispose is subject to the same limitations. I refer the Court to Rop. vs Ly. 1 wl. p. 642. ck co. §7. A. Rhodes