interview was had, when it not being convenient to pay off the note, Complt paid $400 evidenced by the receipt on the back of said 1st receipt & note and gave a new one for $200, payable at sixty days from 22d March, when the first fell due, under the pledge and assurance, that it would be paid; and during the sitting of this court, he desired this defendant to withdraw if from bank, and bring it down to Court, & it should be paid, which defendant did, expecting the money; when he was met by the bill for an injunction: by said agreement, Complt was to pay a further sum at this Court, & give a further note on time, and so on, from time to time, to last the payments; and to satisfy the judgment, during the current year. This defendant has kept his part of the agreement faithfully, and insists there was a good consideration therefore, viz: indulgence, and given day of payment, saving of sheriff's commissions &c he therefore insists that said Complt shall be held to and compelled to perform said agreement on his part (in past evidence by the paper, filed by him). This defendant appropriated the $400 to the purposes of the assignment, now beyond his control, & anticipated the $200 to the same end, never dreaming of any further litigation, and so he says the plaintiff has been guilty of bad faith, fraud, and dissimulation, deserving the rebuke of this Court. He does not come before your honor with clean hands, and should not be entertained by this Court. And proceeding to answer the several allegations of the bill; he says, 1st He supposes the judgment & decree are correctly set out 2d He denies in practice, that the injunction was the proper remedy, or that there was the least necessity or occasion for it; this defendant in the presence of the Court, and as one of the Counsel of Rosser, made or cause to be made, the memo on the office memo book, directing no execution to issue 'till further ordered, and assured the counsel of complt on the presence of the Court, that no execution should issue until the result of the intended application in the chancery cause to the appellate Court for a supercedeas was known, and if not superceded, that the decree would be offsetted against the judgment at law, and hence he says, the injunction was unnecessary. In his opinion, a rule was the proper remedy, but that matter has passed, and is ended, at the expense of some $400 to $500 in damages and costs.